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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae respectfully submit this brief in support of
Petitioner, KSR International Co., because the judgment
below stems from the application of an obviousness test
which is inconsistent with the patent statute, with this Court’s
precedent, and with good patent policy.l
Amici are fourteen law professors who teach and write
about intellectual property at law schools within the United
States and have an interest in the proper interpretation and
application of intellectual property law. Amici believe that
patent law should provide incentives to search for techno-
logical solutions that go beyond routine advances. In con-
trast, the Federal Circuit’s incorrect interpretation of the
obviousness standard, as applied in this case, provides
incentives for seeking patent rights on obvious extensions of
existing technologies. The patenting of obvious extensions
of existing technologies has high social costs and is contrary
to the Constitutional purpose of the patent system.
This case provides the Court with an opportunity to over-
turn the Federal Circuit’s much-criticized current approach to
obviousness, which is at odds with the statutory language,
inconsistent with this Court’s precedent, and contrary to the
goals of the patent system. Unless this Court intervenes,
countless applications and issued patents on obvious tech-
nologies will continue to burden the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office, the federal courts, and the public at large.
I Both parties have consented to the filing of this brief and written
consents have been filed with the clerk. Pursuant o this Court’s Rule
37.6, amici represent hat this brief was not authored in whole or in part
by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity other than amici and
their respective ducational institutions has made a monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief. The names of the educa-
tional institutions are provided for identification purposes only, and the
institutions have not reviewed or approved this brief.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The nonobviousness requirement for patentability is im-
posed so that patents will be granted only for significant
advances over previously known technology. An appropri-
ately tuned standard ensures that patents are awarded only for
"unobvious developments which would not occur spontane-
ously from the application of... ordinary skill." Giles S.
Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
75, 81-82 (1960). Patenting obvious advances which would
have occurred in the ordinary course of competitive research
and development creates an unnecessary drag on innovation
through higher prices to consumers and transaction costs
associated with searching for, licensing, and enforcing these
unnecessary patents. The availability of patents on obvious
combinations overwhelms the Patent and Trademark Office
with applications for patents on obvious combinations of
previously existing technologies.
The statutory nonobviousness standard reflects "a careful
balance between the need to promote innovation and the
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation
are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood
of a competitive economy." Bonito Boats, lnc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). To strike this
balance while avoiding hindsight bias, Congress and this
Court have mandated that obviousness be assessed from the
perspective of the "person having ordinary skill in the art"
(PHOSlTA).
The Federal Circuit has adopted a test for obviousness
which is inconsistent with this Court’s precedent and allows
patents to issue on obvious inventions. The Federal Circuit’s
test denies a patent on a combination of previously available
technology only when the patent examiner or a litigation
opponent can present evidence of a suggestion, motivation,
or teaching to combine in the prior art. Without such a
"suggestion to combine," a claimed invention is never
deemed obvious, regardless of the circumstances surrounding
its development. While this "suggestion test" is framed as a
factual inquiry, it effectively swallows the legal inquiry into
obviousness and imposes an inappropriately low standard.
The suggestion test’s focus on evidence of what could be
done by combining the prior art marginalizes the PHOSITA,
equating ordinary skill with knowledge and motivation and
ignoring the aspect of ordinary skill comprising routine
experimentation and application of ordinary tools, methods,
and problem-solving abilities.
Because a prima facie showing of obviousness cannot be
made without evidence of a "suggestion to combine" prior art
references, the Federal Circuit’s approach also turns this
Court’s observation that the inventive context may be
relevant to assessing obviousness into a one-way ratchet of
"objective indicia of nonobviousness" which can be used
only in support of patent issuance. Compare Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("[S]econdary consid-
erations . . . might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to
be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquiries may have relevance.") with Gambro Lundia
AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (referring to "the fourth prong of the obviousness
determination--the objective indicia of nonobviousness");
Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Inds., 816 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (referring to "objective indicia of nonobviousness
(the so-called ’secondary considerations’"). Framed in this
way, the obviousness inquiry ignores social, economic, and
technical changes that might render particular advances
obvious upon the application of ordinary skill in the art.
Besides its substantive failings, the Federal Circuit’s ap-
proach fails to take advantage of patent examiner expertise.
"[T]he primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable
material lies in the Patent Office," Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
4
Federal Circuit precedent requires patent examiners to
present evidence in the record when seeking to rely on the
common knowledge of those skilled in the art or the nature of
the problem to be solved to meet the suggestion requirement.
See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
By imposing excessively stringent evidentiary requirements
and framing the ultimate judgment of obviousness as essen-
tially a factual inquiry, the Federal Circuit’s approach
hampers the PTO’s application of its expertise to the obvi-
ousness question. This is particularly unfortunate since the
ex parte nature of patent examination leaves the patent
examiners as the only available representatives of the "person
having ordinary skill in the art" during examination. Despite
these limitations imposed on the examiners’ ability to weed
out obvious patent claims, issued patents that combine prior
technology are afforded a presumption of validity which can
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of a
suggestion, motivation, or teaching to combine.
The perspective of the "person of ordinary skill in the art"
must be brought back into its rightful place in the legal
inquiry into obviousness. A robust inquiry into the level of
ordinary skill in the art--which considers not only what is
already known in a particular field, but also what is within
the reach of ordinary skill, including routine experimentation
and application of tools, methods, and problem-solving
abilities--should be undertaken as a basis for the legal
assessment of obviousness.
The consideration given to the technical and social context
in which a claimed invention was made should expand to
incorporate factors suggesting that a claimed invention was
an obvious application of ordinary skill, rather than being
confined to a one-sided inquiry into indicia of nonobvious-
ness. With the Graham paradigm thus reinstated, the pat-
entability standard would better serve its Constitutional
purpose of promoting technological progress.
ARGUMENT
I. Obviousness is a Question of Law Incorporating
Important Issues of Innovation Policy
To obtain protection under federal patent law, technologi-
cal developments within the scope of statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 must meet three substantive require-
ments, which can be summarized as utility, novelty, and non-
obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty),
and 103 (nonobviousness). As this Court has recognized,
[b]oth the novelty and the nonobviousness re-
quirements of federal patent law are grounded
in the notion that concepts within the public
grasp, or those so obvious that they readily
could be, are the tools of creation available to
all. They provide the baseline of free competi-
tion upon which the patent system’s incentive
to creative effort depends.
Bonito Boats, lnc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 156 (1989). This legal standard has Constitutional
dimensions. "Innovation, advancement, and things which
add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in
a patent system which by constitutional command must
’promote the Progress of... useful Arts.’ This is the stan-
dard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ig-
nored." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)
(emphasis in original).
Because the novelty condition precludes patenting only if a
claimed invention is completely anticipated by a single piece
of prior art, the requirement of nonobviousness is the sole
provision which fully implements the core notion of patent
law that patents should be granted only for significant
advances over previously known technology. Patents are
awarded as "an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge."
Graham, 383 U.S. at 9. Thus, as articulated by one of the
principal drafters of the 1952 Patent Act, only "unobvious
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developments which would not occur spontaneously from the
application of... ordinary skill" are patentable. Giles S.
Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
75, 81-82 (1960). Obvious developments "will be made
anyway, without the ’fuel of interest’ which the patent
system supplies." Id. Patenting combinations of what is
already known that would have been developed without the
patent incentive needlessly imposes the costs of exclusivity
on the public.
To implement the core patent policy of granting patents
only on significant advances in knowledge, Congress chose a
standard embodied in Section 103 of the Patent Act, which
denies patent protection when "the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter per-
tains." 35 U.S.C. § 103. The statutory standard embodies "a
careful balance between the need to promote innovation and
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imita-
tion are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy." Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.
at 146.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has devel-
oped a different, and lower, standard than that embodied in
the Patent Act. Rather than focus on what the person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art would find obvious, the
Federal Circuit’s test denies a patent only if there is evidence
of a specific "suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine
the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed."
Appendix to Petition for Certiorari (hereinafter "Pet. App.")
at 6a (citing prior Federal Circuit authorities). This "sugges-
tion test" is found neither in the Patent Act nor in this Court’s
relevant precedent. It sets the patentability threshold below
what would be appropriate to ensure that patents, on average,
are granted when they are needed to induce technological
7progress beyond that which will occur as a matter of course
without the patent incentive.
The ultimate question of whether a particular technological
advance is sufficient to merit an award of patent exclusivity
is a question of law. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, citing Great
A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155
(1950). This is as it must be--the determination whether
"the difference between [a] new thing and what was known
before" is "sufficiently great to warrant a patent" is at bottom
a question of innovation policy. Graham, 383 U.S. at 14-15,
quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952) and H. R. Rep. No. 82-
1923 (1952). Implicit in the legal interpretation of the
statutory phrase "would have been obvious" is a determina-
tion of just how nonobvious a new development must be
before a patent is granted.
The baseline of free competition, coupled with first mover
advantages and other means of profiting from innovative
activity, such as robust trademark protection, provides a
natural engine of technical progress on which the patent
system is meant to build. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Non-
Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 491, 493 (2003) (noting non-
patent incentives for invention and citing Wesley M. Cohen
et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or
Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
W7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7552 (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) for survey evidence
indicating the importance of non-patent incentives).
Patents are not necessary for advances that are the natural
outcome of the competitive market in a particular technology
and its concomitant routine level of research and develop-
ment. Patents, rather, ought to inspire those inventive efforts
and disclosures that would otherwise be deterred by the free
riding of competitors. Granting patents on innovations that
are not substantial enough to require a patent incentive
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imposes high social costs--including the transaction costs of
licensing, deterrence of follow-on invention, and the admin-
istrative and litigation costs of unnecessary patent examina-
tion and enforcement. See Joseph S. Miller, Building a
Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 667, 690 (2004) (discussing
social costs of improvidently granted patents).
The appropriate level of inventiveness necessary for pat-
entability may vary by technological area. Some technologi-
cal areas, such as software, tend to be highly cumulative and
incremental. In such an art, it will often be well within the
competence of the ordinarily skilled artisan to take pieces of
prior technology and meld them together into a new whole.
Other areas, such as pharmaceuticals, may be less predictable
and may require large investments and long years of research
to make significant advances. The statutory requirement
reflects this variance because it judges obviousness from the
perspective of the "person having ordinary skill in the art" (or
PHOSITA), thus incorporating differences in the baseline
competitive processes in different fields. The PHOSITA
perspective is critical if we are both to avoid awarding
patents for developments that would arise as a matter of
course in the ordinary application of inventive skill and to
avoid denying patents to inventions that appear deceptively
simple in hindsight but pose problems not evident to the
outsider to a particular technology.
In Graham, this Court laid out three central factual ques-
tions which must be answered in order for the legal determi-
nation of obviousness to be made: "the scope and content of
the prior art are to be determined; differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved." Graham,
383 U.S. at 17. This Court also noted the potential for the
"circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented" to provide some additional "indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness." The Graham factors, along
9with the non-technical "secondary considerations," provide
input for answering the legal question of obviousness. They
amply guard against the application of hindsight by focusing
the entire inquiry on the context in which an invention was
made.
II. The Federal Circuit’s Suggestion Test Collapses the
Legal Determination of Nonobviousness into a Factual
Determination of What is Available in the Prior Art.
Over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has gradu-
ally developed an obviousness test which effectively replaces
the broad legal and policy considerations properly embodied
in the obviousness determination with a factual inquiry into
what is already available in the prior art. The Federal Circuit
permits invalidation of patents (or denial of applications) for
obviousness only when challengers can present evidence of a
"suggestion or incentive," ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v.
Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
"teaching, suggestion or incentive," In re Geiger, 815 F.2d
686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987), "reason, suggestion, or motiva-
tion," In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
"teaching, suggestion or motivation," In re Raynes, 7 F.3d
1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993), to combine previously existing
technologies in the prior art. Evidence of such a "suggestion
to combine" "in the prior art" is part of the prima facie
showing of obviousness that patent examiners or later
litigants must make. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242
F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001), ("in holding an invention
obvious in view of a combination of references, there must
be some suggestion, motivation, or teaching in the prior art
that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to
select the references and combine them in the way that
would produce the claimed invention.")
This suggestion test cannot be found anywhere in Section
103 or in any other part of the Patent Act. This Court has
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directly addressed the issue of obviousness on several
occasions. None of its discussions gives any basis for
grafting a suggestion test onto the statutory language. See
e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18 (laying out the factors
underlying the nonobviousness determination). Indeed, in its
seminal interpretation of Section 103 of the Patent Act in
Graham, this Court not only discussed the factors relevant to
the determination of obviousness without once mentioning a
"suggestion test," it also reversed an appellate court’s finding
of nonobviousness despite the appellate court’s conclusion
that there was "nothing in the prior art suggesting [the]
unique combination of these old features" in the claimed
invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 30. Thus, it would appear
that the Federal Circuit’s suggestion test would have led to
the opposite result in Graham itself.
While the suggestion test is framed as a factual inquiry, it,
unlike the factual inquiries laid out by this Court in Graham,
essentially preempts the legal inquiry by focusing on what is
already in the prior art, leaving scant space for legal and
expert assessment. History and common sense teach that
competition itself is an engine of innovation, propelling
progress even without the incentives provided by patent
rights. Yet the suggestion test answers the legal and policy
questions of obviousness by imposing a uniformly low
standard which is little more than a generalized novelty
requirement.
IlL The Suggestion Test Lowers the Nonobviousness
Standard by Disregarding the Ordinary Problem-
Solving Ability of the Skilled Artisan.
By replacing the legal inquiry into obviousness with a
factual inquiry into motivation to combine, the suggestion
test essentially swallows the obviousness inquiry. It obscures
the importance of the factual inquiry into the level of ordi-
nary skill in the art mandated by this Court and required by
the statutory command to judge obviousness from the
11
perspective of the "person having ordinary skill in the art."
As Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has noted:
[The Federal Circuit] has all but ignored the
statutory directive that judgments of nonobvi-
ousness be made from the perspective of the
PHOSITA [person having ordinary skill in the
art]. Today, PHOSITA sits on the sidelines of
obviousness analysis. Courts consult
PHOSITA on the scope, content, and meaning
of prior art references but not on the ultimate
question of whether the invention would have
been obvious at the time it was made in light
of the prior art.
Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inven-
tions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 885, 888 (2004).
The Federal Circuit’s analysis in this very case exemplifies
the short shrift given to the person of ordinary skill in the art.
The Federal Circuit stated that, besides explicit suggestions
"in the prior art references," implicit suggestions to combine
might be found "in the knowledge of those of ordinary skill
in the art that certain references.., are of special interest or
importance in the field;" or "from the nature of the problem
to be solved, leading inventors to look to references relating
to possible solutions to that problem." Pet. App. at 6a.
(Citations omitted). The District Court had based its finding
of a suggestion or motivation to combine references in part
on the "nature of the problem to be solved." Pet. App. at
42a-43a. The Federal Circuit rejected the District Court’s
findings because the "nature of the problem to be solved"
provides a cognizable motivation to combine references only
when "two prior art references address the precise problem
that the patentee was trying to solve." Pet. App. at 12a. In
this instance, the problems addressed by the references did
not track the specifics of the patent at issue quite precisely
enough. Pet. App. at 12a-13a.
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Despite lip service to the inquiry into whether the nature of
the problem would have "led a person of ordinary skill in the
art to combine the prior art teachings in the particular manner
claimed," Pet. App. at 12a, the Federal Circuit’s analysis paid
no attention to how such a person would have viewed the
prior art references in light of the problem the patentee was
trying to solve. There was apparently no room for the
possibility that a person of ordinary skill in the art might find
it obvious to apply prior art technology to a problem slightly
different from the problem articulated in the prior art refer-
ence.
As applied in this case, the knowledge of those of ordinary
skill in the art is used to help determine the scope and content
of the applicable prior art, but there appears to be no room
for the application of routine problem-solving skill. The
nature of the problem similarly serves only to motivate a
search for references addressing the specific problem at hand.
This approach limits the role of the PHOSITA to that of a
sort of reference librarian, who can locate appropriate prior
art references but is apparently incapable of applying or
recombining them with even a modicum of creativity in light
of his or her knowledge and skill.
The suggestion test is not needed for selecting which refer-
ences should be considered in assessing obviousness, how-
ever. The "scope and content of the prior art" is determined
by the doctrine of analogous arts. See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381
F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Two separate tests define 
scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the
same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed
and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inven-
tor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved."). See also Graham, 383 U.S. at 35 ("The prob-
lems confronting Scoggin and the insecticide industry were
not insecticide problems; they were mechanical closure
problems. Closure devices in such a closely related art as
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pouring spouts for liquid containers are at the very least
pertinent references.") Once the scope and content of the
prior art are determined, obviousness should be assessed by
considering what advances an ordinarily skilled artisan could
make based on that art, not by determining whether the
references address the same problem as the invention under
review.
Some recent Federal Circuit opinions have begun to sug-
gest a broader view of the scope of implicit suggestions to
combine prior art references. See, e.g., Princeton Biocherni-
cals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir.
2004). The recent opinion in In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988, for
example, states that "in considering motivation in the obvi-
ousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific
problem solved by the invention but the general problem that
confronted the inventor before the invention was made."
According to this recent take on the suggestion test:
[t]he motivation-suggestion-teaching test asks
not merely what the references disclose, but
whether a person of ordinary skill in the art,
possessed with the understandings and knowl-
edge reflected in the prior art, and motivated
by the general problem facing the inventor,
would have been led to make the combination
recited in the claims. From this it may be de-
termined whether the overall disclosures,
teachings, and suggestions of the prior art, and
the level of skill in the art--i.e., the under-
standings and knowledge of persons having
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the in-
vention-support the legal conclusion of ob-
viousness.
ld. (Emphasis added).
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While this attempt to employ a broader version of the sug-
gestion test is an improvement over the narrower version
applied in many other cases, it still does not solve the under-
lying failings of the "suggestion test." Even here, in perhaps
its broadest statement of the test to date, the Federal Circuit
does not acknowledge that ordinary skill encompasses more
than knowledge. The court explicitly equates "the level of
skill in the art" with "understandings and knowledge." This
equation ignores the part of ordinary skill comprising routine
experimentation and application of ordinary tools, methods,
and problem-solving abilities and continues to preempt the
legal assessment of whether a particular advance was suffi-
cient to warrant a patent by a factual inquiry into the content
of the prior art.
"Trained scientists, engineers and other practitioners are
seldom so dull-witted as to unvaryingly require the specific,
step-by-step combination of elements from the prior art."
John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am.
U. L. Rev. 771, 802 (2003). As Professor Eisenberg has
noted, "[a]ctive practitioners of a technology bring more to a
problem than may be found in written prior art, including
training, judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledge acquired
through field experience. Scientific and technological work
involve the application of craft skills that are familiar to
practitioners but defy explicit articulation." Eisenberg, 19
Berkeley Tech. L.J., at 897, citing Jerome R. Ravetz, Scien-
tific Knowledge and its Social Problems 75-76 (1971).
The Federal Trade Commission has also recognized the
extent to which the suggestion test neglects the ordinary
creativity of the PHOSITA:
Inventive processes typically involve judg-
ment, experience, and common sense capable
of connecting some dots. The suggestion test,
rigidly applied, assumes away a PHOSITA’s
typical levels of creativity and insight and
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supports findings of nonobviousness even
when only a modicum of additional insight is
needed .... The presence of ’specific and de-
finitive art references with clear motivation of
how to combine those references’ may con-
firm the obviousness of an invention. In con-
trast, the absence of such prior art references
does not provide any evidence about whether
a PHOSITA could have combined prior art
references to achieve the invention, given the
typical level of insight in that field.
Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy,
Chap. 4, at 14 (2003). (Emphasis added.) As the 
recognizes, the presence of a suggestion, teaching or motiva-
tion to combine prior art references demonstrates obvious-
ness, but only consideration of whether the application of
ordinary skill could have produced the claimed invention
within a reasonable time frame can determine whether the
invention meets the legal standard of non-obviousness.
The Federal Circuit’s approach to the "nature of the prob-
lem" prong does not overcome the suggestion test’s basic
confusion of (a) the underlying factual inquiry into the
relevant context in which the claimed invention was made
with (b) the legal inquiry as to whether the associated ad-
vance over the prior art is sufficient to warrant a patent. The
question whether the advance represented by the patent
claims is sufficiently beyond what would result from routine
research and development without the patent incentive is not
a factual inquiry into whether the "nature of the problem to
be solved" would motivate the invention.
The predominant role assigned to the suggestion test has
had the effect of marginalizing the determination of the
"level of ordinary skill in the art." This marginalization is
evident from a reading of the case law. Often there is no
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explicit consideration of the level of ordinary skill in the art
at all. Even when it is nominally considered, the result is
usually a recitation of a "resume of the person of ordinary
skill in the art." Once this "resume" has been established,
however, it rarely, if ever, plays any role in the substantive
consideration of the obviousness issue. At the Federal
Circuit’s inception, it set out factors to be considered in
determining the level of ordinary skill in the art in Environ-
mental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696
(Fed. Cir. 1983), yet it has rarely discussed those factors 
its opinions. See Joseph P. Meara, Just Who is the Person
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious
Personage, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 267, 278, 289 (2002) (noting
that "[a]t the end of the year 2000, only five of the court’s
obviousness opinions cited the factors of Environmental
Designs" and that in those "five subsequent nonobviousness
opinions citing the factors of Environmental Designs, the
Federal Circuit has provided little guidance for the use of the
factors."). Indeed, the Federal Circuit appears not to have
referred to the factors for determining the level of skill in the
art at all since 2000.
In effect, the Federal Circuit’s approach substitutes knowl-
edge in the art--"the understandings and knowledge of
persons having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention"--for skill in the art--the methods, tools, and
problem-solving skills that are routinely applied in a particu-
lar field of technology. It substitutes factual questions about
suggestions to combine the prior art for the legal determina-
tion of the sufficiency of the claimed advances in light of the
prior art.
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IV. The Federal Circuit’s Suggestion Test Precludes
Consideration of Relevant Social and Economic Fac-
tors Indicating Obviousness
In Graham, this Court recognized that certain "secondary
considerations" "might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to
be patented." Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. Graham listed
"commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc." as potentially relevant "indicia of obviousness or
nonobviousness," (emphasis added), and explicitly antici-
pated a "case-by-case development" of the obviousness test.
Contrary to that expectation, the Federal Circuit has frozen
the inquiry into "the circumstances surrounding the origin of
the subject matter sought to be patented" into a rigid list of
"objective indicia of nonobviousness," Orthopedic Equip-
ment Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, lnc., 707 F.2d 1376,
1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (equating
"secondary considerations" with "objective indicia of nonob-
viousness"), which can only be used as a thumb on the
nonobvious side of the scale. The threshold nature of the
suggestion test turns the inquiry into contextual indications
of "obviousness or nonobviousness" into a one-way ratchet
which can only contribute to patent issuance. Without a
"motivation to combine" in the prior art, a claimed invention
is never deemed obvious, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding its development. On the other hand, the Federal
Circuit requires that "objective indicia of nonobviousness" be
considered in every case----even when there is a finding of a
motivation to combine. Stratoflex, lnc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[E]vidence rising 
of the so-called ’secondary considerations’ must always
when present be considered en route to a determination of
obviousness.")
Recent experience suggests that there are additional con-
textual factors that should inform the obviousness inquiry.
Social and economic developments may strongly evidence
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the obviousness of particular advances. Circumstantial
indications of obviousness might include technical advances
within or outside of the particular field of the invention at
issue that motivate the combination at hand. For example,
the development of personal computers and the intemet and
other computing advances have given rise to numerous
opportunities to make use of computers in ways that were
obvious to those skilled in the art once the technology
became available. Methodological advances in the biotech-
nology area have led to results that many have argued should
not have been patentable due to the ease with which they
could be achieved once the tools became available. As
Professors Dan L. Burk and Mark Lemley remark, "the
Federal Circuit has bent over backwards to find biotechno-
logical inventions nonobvious, even if the prior art demon-
strates a clear plan for producing the invention." Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155,
1156 (2002). Especially in fast-moving fields, nearly simul-
taneous development of the same advance by more than one
party may indicate the obviousness of the advance even if
there is a race to patent the result. (This will not always be
the case, of course, since sometimes near-simultaneous
development may be the result of patent-inspired investment
solving a particular problem.) At a minimum, nearly concur-
rent development by others who do not race to patent the
results is strong evidence that an advance was obvious.
Other social changes may give rise to or draw attention to a
particular problem, the solution to which becomes obvious
once attention is paid to it. A change in the law, for example,
might give rise to a new possibility to combine prior technol-
ogy in a commercially attractive way. See Jay Dratler, Jr.,
Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 Akron
L. Rev. 299, 302 (2005) (arguing that the patent claims 
issue in the case of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signa-
ture Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
involved merely "pedestrian arithmetic calculations, mostly
19
as required by rules of the SEC and other accounting and tax
authorities."); Richard H. Stem, Scope-of-Protection Prob-
lems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing
Business, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 105
(1999), App. A, (comparing the patent claims State Str eet
Bank with U.S. tax law concerning flow-through of pool
income to a partner and avoidance of taxation of the pool
entity and purporting to show that the claims merely track
the applicable IRS regulations). Other social and cultural
changes may have similar effects. See, e.g., Scott & Williams
v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 300 F. 622, 624-27 (D.N.Y. 1924) (L.
Hand, J.) (concluding that a new stocking seam arrangement
invented in response to changing consumer tastes was an
unpatentable variation of prior art seams, notwithstanding its
great commercial success), aff’d 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1925).
Consideration of the way in which changing technological,
social, or economic context can give rise to obvious combi-
nations of prior technologies is in some sense the converse of
the "long-felt need" indicator of nonobviousness. If a need
has only recently arisen or become apparent, a solution may
become obvious at around the same time. When the obvi-
ousness standard does not recognize this possibility, each
social or technical development can lead to a "gold rush" of
socially wasteful efforts to patent combinations of well-
known technology in response to that development.
The rubric of inventive context also provides an appropri-
ate place for the consideration of how old components of a
new technology interact. This Court’s most recent precedent
on the subject of obviousness has been interpreted by some
as setting out a special "synergy test" for interactions among
components of so-called "combination patents." See Sak-
raida v. Ag Pro, lnc., 425 U.S. 273,282 (1976) ("We cannot
agree that the combination of these old elements to produce
an abrupt release of water directly on the barn floor from
storage tanks or pools can properly be characterized as
synergistic."); Anderson’s-Black Rock, lnc. v. Pavement
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Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) ("A combination 
elements may result in an effect greater than the sum of the
several effects taken separately. No such synergistic result is
argued here."), both citing Great A&P Tea Co., 340 U.S. at
152, ("Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims
with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability
of finding invention in an assembly of old elements.") 2 A
"synergy test" was rejected by the Federal Circuit and
criticized by commentators because of the difficulty in
differentiating combination patents from all others and the
vagueness of the synergy concept. See Stratoflex, 713 F.2d
at 1540 ("A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic
effect" is nowhere found in the statute.., synergism may
point toward nonobviousness, but its absence has no place in
evaluating the evidence on obviousness"); Chore-Time
Equipment, lnc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 781
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("References to synergism as a patentability
requirement are, therefore, unnecessary and confusing.") See
also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L.
Rev. 803, n. 39 (1988) (describing discontent with 
synergy test). Amici do not advocate implementation of a
"synergy test." However, the presence of unanticipated
effects from the interactions among components of an
invention may be evidence of nonobviousness. Conversely,
the fact that a novel development consists only of a combina-
tion of prior art elements------each of which performs the
same function as it did in prior art settings--may be evidence
that the combination was an obvious one, perhaps motivated
by some social change.
In sum, various contextual factors may have spurred the
combination or extension of previously available technology
in a way that would have been obvious to a person having
2 See, however, Brief of Economists and Legal Historians filed in this
case for a historical perspective on this Court’s obviousness jurispru-
dence.
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ordinary skill in the art in light of those factors. The Federal
Circuit’s suggestion test, combined with its narrow focus on
"indicia of nonobviousness," ignores contextual indications
of obviousness. This one-sided view of the inventive milieu
leads to the issuance of patents on routine advances that
result from applying ordinary inventive skill to changing
circumstances.
V. The Suggestion Test is Not Reasonably Applicable by
the PTO and Negates the Agency’s Expertise
Besides the substantive failings detailed in the preceding
sections, the Federal Circuit’s approach fails to take advan-
tage of the technical expertise of the examiner corps and
arguably undermines the role of the PTO as a matter of
administrative law. See Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K.
Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can
Learn from Administrative Law, 95 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming
2006) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s approach to patent
law is inconsistent with standard administrative law doe-
trines). 3 Moreover, the suggestion test is extremely difficult
for the PTO to implement effectively. Though this particular
case arises out of infringement litigation, it is important in
crafting an approach to the obviousness issue to keep in mind
that "the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable
material lies in the Patent Office." Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
The inability of the PTO to weed out obvious patents under
the Federal Circuit’s suggestion test is extremely detrimental
to the health of the patent system because, as this Court has
recognized, "[t]o await litigation is--for all practical pur-
poses-to debilitate the patent system." Id. The difficulty
the PTO has in applying the suggestion test stems from the
Federal Circuit’s strict requirement that the patent examiner
search for and present additional evidence in the record when
the examiner seeks to rely on the knowledge of one skilled in
3 It is our understanding that a copy of this article will be filed in this
case by Professors Benjamin and Rai.
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the art or the nature of the problem to be solved to demon-
strate a suggestion to combine prior art references.
Federal Circuit precedent makes clear that patent examin-
ers cannot rely on common knowledge in the art or on their
own technical knowledge in the art as a basis for rejecting
patent applications. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("’Common knowledge and common sense,’
even if assumed to derive from the agency’s expertise, do not
substitute for authority when the law requires authority.")
(Citation omitted). As a result, the Federal Circuit has
forbidden the PTO to deny a patent based on common
knowledge in the art unless the examiner can point to specific
evidence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
the particular existing references and has limited the ability
of the PTO to rely on official notice as it is generally con-
ceived in the agency context. See Benjamin and Rai, 95 Geo.
L.J. at.
Excessively stringent evidentiary requirements and framing
of the ultimate judgment of obviousness as essentially a
factual inquiry hamper the PTO’s application of its expertise
to the obviousness question. Common knowledge is not
often the subject of detailed written exposition, making it
difficult and costly for the patent examiner to find evidence
of common knowledge to meet the Federal Circuit’s sugges-
tion test. As the National Academy of Sciences recently
explained in its report on the patent system: "[S]cientists,
artisans, and creative people generally speaking strive to
publish non-obvious information. So if it is obvious to those
of skill in the art to combine references, it is unlikely that
they will publish such information." Stephen A. Merrill et
al., National Research Council, National Academy of Sci-
ences, .4 Patent System for the 21~t Century (2004) at 90.
Moreover, technological advances and expansive interpre-
tations of the scope of patentable subject matter have resulted
in the issuance of patents in areas, such as software and
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business method patents, in which the common knowledge of
the art has not traditionally been documented in easily
accessible forms such as patents and academic publications.
The Federal Circuit’s emphasis on documentation of what is
widely known in the art is particularly problematic for
patenting in these areas. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, lnternet
Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 Mich.
Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 253, 279-80 (2000-2001)
(discussing the limited availability of documentary prior art
in the areas of business methods and software). In attempt-
ing to find documentation of what is commonly known in the
art, patent examiners must waste time and resources search-
ing for specific articulations of common, but largely tacit,
knowledge. This is particularly unfortunate since PTO
examiners are selected and trained in the subject matter of the
patents they examine and their duties naturally keep them up
to date.
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s obviousness test fails to take
advantage of agency expertise and all but requires the PTO to
base its analyses on documentary evidence of obviousness,
which will often be difficult and costly to find or unavailable.
The test will thus allow patents to issue in many cases where
combining pre-existing technologies would have been an
obvious step for a person having ordinary skill in the art.
VI. The Suggestion Test’s Low Standard of Patentability
is Bad Patent Policy
The low standard for patentability that results from applica-
tion of the suggestion test leads inevitably to the grant of
patent rights to combinations of existing technological
knowledge for which no patent incentive was needed. Such
patents not only do not "promote the Progress of... useful
Arts," see U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, they have pernicious
social effects. Amici are convinced that the suggestion test
results in the issuance and enforcement of many such patents
that should be declared invalid as obvious. See, e.g., Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech.
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L. Rev. 363, 370-379 (2000) (presenting a statistical study
showing a drop in Federal Circuit patent invalidations for
obviousness, and identifying the Circuit’s suggestion test as
one of the causes).
The availability of patents on obvious combinations over-
whelms the Patent and Trademark Office with applications
for patents on obvious combinations of previously existing
technologies, promotes socially wasteful races to patent these
obvious advances, and raises patent search costs for those
seeking to combine existing technologies. See, e.g., Bron-
wyn H. Hall and Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the
U.S. Patent System--Design Choices and Expected Impact,
19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 989, 992-1000 (2004) (discussing
potential problems caused by low quality patents, presenting
evidence of issuance of lower quality patents by the PTO,
and relating the issuance of lower quality patents to the
suggestion test for obviousness).
The overpatenting that results from the Federal Circuit’s
suggestion test creates an unnecessary drag on innovation
through higher prices to consumers and transaction costs
associated with searching for, licensing, and enforcing these
unnecessary patents. Those interested only in combining
existing technologies in obvious ways must nonetheless
expend resources searching for possible patents on those
obvious combinations. Anyone who wants to use an unnec-
essarily patented combination of technologies will have to
negotiate permission from and pay royalties to the owners of
any patents on the individual elements, and to the owner of
the patent in the combination. The costs of patents that are
unnecessary to promote innovation also include "the benefits
lost when a course of research is foregone out of fear that a
product cannot be produced without obtaining a license that
may be unavailable. Even when a product is produced, there
may be costs in restructuring a research program to design
around existing patents." Barton, 43 IDEA at 475, 494.
When two or more parties can block the practical application
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of technology, the difficulty and social cost of developing
that practical application increases significantly, raising the
likelihood of "patent thickets." See, e.g., Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in Innovation Policy and the
Economy (Adam Jaffe et al., eds., 2001); see also Michael
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
Science, May 1, 1998, at 698-99.
The low threshold of nonobviousness promotes undesir-
able business practices. It provides incentives to invest in
socially wasteful efforts to patent run-of-the-mill combina-
tions of previously known technologies and makes it easier to
"trap" competitors in inadvertent infringement, thus motivat-
ing the "patent troll" business model. It also motivates the
practice of "evergreening"--using minor improvement
patents to retain control over a technology (such as a drug)
that would otherwise go into the public domain. In addition,
it motivates true innovators to divert some of their resources
away from further technical advancement and toward identi-
fying and claiming all possible combinations of their new
technologies with existing technologies in order to prevent
others from getting patents that would block important and
obvious applications of their technologies.
The predictable result of the availability of patents on ob-
vious combinations of existing elements is that it becomes
more difficult to bring the benefits of technology to society,
thus undermining the ultimate goal of patent law.
VII. This Court Should Mandate a Return to the Graham
Approach, Asking Whether the Claimed Invention
Could Be Made By Routine Application of the Level
of Ordinary Skill in the Art
The perspective of the "person of ordinary skill in the art"
must be brought back to its rightful place in the legal inquiry
into obviousness. While the occasional appearance in
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Federal Circuit opinions of more leeway for suggestions
stemming from the "nature of the problem" is an improve-
ment over the strict approach evident in this case, it is not a
solution. The expansion of the "nature of the problem to be
solved" prong hides a legal decision within a supposed
question of fact and masks an inadequate determination of
the level of skill in the art. Especially when a thorough
investigation of the level of skill in the art is not made,
expanded use of the "nature of the problem" prong also
invites a back-door re-entry of hindsight bias because it is
most likely to be applied to simpler technologies where the
connection of the nature of the problem to be solved to the
claimed invention is most apparent to courts.
The presence of a "teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine" prior art references evidences obviousness, but the
absence of such a suggestion to combine is not an appropriate
test for nonobviousness. This Court should require a return
to the inquiry set out in Graham. The analogous arts doe-
trine provides a methodology for determining the scope and
content of the prior art which----especially if updated to allow
for progress in search technology and the increasing impor-
tance of interdisciplinary research and development teamsm
is entirely adequate for the task. A robust inquiry into the
level of ordinary skill in the art would set the stage for a legal
determination of whether the application of that ordinary skill
to the problem at hand would have led to the claimed solu-
tion in the course of baseline competition.
The factual determination of the level of ordinary skill in
the art should not be limited to the content of prior art
references, the common knowledge of those in the art, and
any suggestions to combine the art that are found in those
references or knowledge. It should also encompass the
PHOSITA’s ordinary inventive skills, the tools and methods
routinely applied in her field, and the kinds of experimenta-
tion she does and problems she solves as a matter of course.
As with the determination of analogous arts, the determina-
tion of level of ordinary skill should evolve with the technol-
ogy itself, incorporating, for example, the extent to which
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research and development in a particular field routinely
draws on interdisciplinary teams.
Once a more complete picture of the ordinary skill in the
art is drawn, the legal inquiry as to obviousness can proceed
to determine "if the difference between the new thing and
what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to
warrant a patent." Because a serious inquiry into the level of
skill in the art would incorporate not only what is already
known in a particular field, but also what is routinely in-
vented, it would naturally incorporate technological differ-
ences in the competitive baseline. An obviousness standard
that takes into account the routine experimentation and
problem-solving skill of the PHOSITA is also self-correcting
to some extent. If a more stringent patentability standard
reduces the baseline progress in a particular field, a pat-
entability standard based on the routine level of skill and
progress in the field will adjust so that more patents are
issued.
With the Graham paradigm reinstated, the consideration
given to the technical and social context in which a claimed
invention was made should expand to incorporate not only
factorswsuch as long-felt need--evidencing nonobvious-
ness, but also factors--such as a newly appreciated need or a
recent technological development--suggesting the obvious-
ness of a claimed invention.
All obviousness tests are susceptible to two types of er-
ror----erroneous issuance and erroneous rejection. Both types
are socially costly. The Federal Circuit’s suggestion test
bends over backwards to prevent hindsight (and hence
prevent the rejection of patents that should have issued), but
does little to prevent unwarranted patent issuance. The
Graham approach, on the other hand, mitigates the risk of
either form of error--avoiding hindsight with its structured
inquiry into the factual context at the time of invention, while
protecting against the issuance of patents on routine advances
with a robust inquiry into the level of ordinary skill in the art
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and the inventive context. The Graham approach better
serves the public welfare.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should set a standard
for the obviousness determination that prevents the patenting
of numerous advances that would have occurred as a result of
routine development, returns the focus to the problem-
solving capability of the person having ordinary skill in the
art, accommodates contextual evidence of obviousness as
well as nonobviousness, and makes room for the application
of USPTO expertise.
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